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Abstract

This thesis uses regression to analyze the savings resulting from the previous four
rounds of BRAC in terms of their affect on each of the Air Force budget appropriations.
For each appropriation, while the number of major installations initially appears to be a
significant determinant in explaining the change in the budget, the number of bases
becomes insignificant if a surrogate for Air Force mission requirements is included as the
explanatory variable. We tested three surrogate measures for mission requirements:
number of flying hours, number of aircraft, and number of active duty personnel. In each
case, we found the number of active duty Air Force members to be a better predictor of
the budget level than the regression model that included the number of major
installations. We conclude that mission requirements are a better indicator of the
required funding than the number of major installations.

IX

BRAC TO THE FUTURE: AN ANALYSIS OF
PAST SAVINGS FROM BASE CLOSINGS

1. Introduction

1.1. The Reality of Base Closings
It is a rare spectacle that takes place in the corridors of the Pentagon the
day the Defense Department releases the list of bases it intends to close.
People gather outside room 2E765, the public affairs office. They're not
reporters; they're employees and officials from potentially affected bases
trying to discover if their bases will survive. The reporters march into the
grey and blue newsroom in a solemn procession, sign a paper, and are
handed the thick, yellow-covered list of recommended closings. Once out
in the hallway, the anxious onlookers descend on the reporters bearing the
lists. It's like the scene from the short story The Lottery, as each clamors
to discover whether the draw will let him live or die. There is wild
rejoicing as some discover their bases have been spared. And there is also
deep dejection—indeed, to the point of tears—when some bases are
targeted. Few other things so vividly drive home the consequences of the
base realignment and closure process and its human impact than this
Pentagon scene...
- David Silverberg, "BRAC Attach!" [17:40]

Since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the Department of Defense has
had the daunting task of paring down the nation's military infrastructure commensurate
with the reductions in the mission, personnel, and defense budget. Under the authority
granted by Congress, an independent Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
Commission has worked with the Defense Department on four separate occasions to
provide the Executive and Legislative branches with a list of installations recommended

for closure. Subsequently, approval was granted to close 97 of 495 major domestic
installations, as shown in Appendix A [15:12].
As a result of these necessary actions, the dissemination of the recommendations
from the independent BRAC Commissions have resulted in several iterations of the
aforementioned scenario of dejection. And undoubtedly, as Congress considers the
Defense Department's request for the authority to initiate two additional rounds of
closure and realignment actions, the image of disheartenment and disappointment will
weigh heavy on their minds as they weigh the costs and benefits of subsequent rounds.

1.2. Research Problem
Following the end of the Cold War, the United States military has been able to
significantly reduce its alert posture. For example, the Minutemen II operation was
cancelled in 1991 and bomber crews are no longer maintained within minutes of
executing their missions. With current views that economic competition is more
important than military readiness, the military budgets have been significantly reduced.
Thus, the military services are continually in search for means to be more efficient with
the budgets prescribed by the civilian leadership.
"Since the height of the Cold War, the defense budget has been reduced by about
40 percent, overall force structure has been reduced by 36 percent, and procurement has
decreased by almost 70 percent; yet, during the same period, the number of bases in the
United States has dropped by only 21 percent (26 percent world-wide)" [7]. The
reductions in the budget, force structure, and procurement strongly suggest the need for
further reductions in base infrastructure, as DoD contends there should be a one-to-one

ratio between percentage changes in force structure and infrastructure. Additional base
closings may afford the Defense Department the means to reduce infrastructure costs and
reallocate resources for more efficient use.
In the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and 1998 Report of the
Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC Report), the Honorable
William Cohen, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), expressed the need for two additional
rounds of BRAC. The need for the two additional rounds is predicated on the concept of
eliminating excess installations to achieve a proper balance between our military
infrastructure and force structure. Furthermore, DoD contends that the savings generated
by BRAC could be used to fund future readiness and weapons modernization and
acquisition programs, if Congress were to fund the Defense Department in accordance
with the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
In spite of the anticipated benefits resulting from the elimination of excess
infrastructure, the ensuing economies of scale, and extensive long-term savings as touted
by the BRAC Report, the Defense Department has received major opposition from
civilian leadership on Capitol Hill. "Many members of Congress have been reluctant to
support additional base closure rounds because they were concerned about the costs and
savings from prior base closure rounds, their economic impact, and executive branch
implementation of the 1995 BRAC Commission's recommendations regarding
McClelland and Kelly Air Force bases in California and Texas, respectively" [11:34].
The consternation of Congress has resulted in the rejection of several proposed
amendments to the National Defense Authorization to establish additional rounds, the
most recent in June 2000.

The biggest point of contention, however, rests on the costs and savings attributed
to the first four rounds. Current accounting systems make it extremely difficult to track
detailed cost in budget data because the financial data is so aggregated. When costs are
identified, it is difficult to determine if these costs attributed to BRAC would have
occurred in its absence [13:4]. For instances, would the permanent change of station
costs attributed to base closures occurred due to normal military transfers, or is the
reduced personnel cost derived from the decreased mission with the end of the Cold War
or from base closures? More difficult than determining costs, it is impossible to track
savings in the budget data. The accounting systems used by the Defense Department do
not have the capability to assess savings, therefore, DoD uses estimates from the Cost of
Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model—a model designed specifically to compare
BRAC options as opposed to measuring specific cost and savings estimates.
As DoD postures itself for a new administration, a possible recession, and the
potential for more budget cuts, a decision about the need for additional base closings is
crucial. In the absence of definitive cost and savings information, this research attempts
to substantiate savings attributed to BRAC based on changes in the aggregate budget.

1.3. Research Objective
This research tests whether the number of major installations drives the Air Force
budgets and expenditures, or if surrogate measures for Air Force mission requirements
provide a more reasonable explanation. We accomplish this by developing descriptive
models using Air Force budget data to illustrate the impact of the number of major
installations versus surrogate measures of Air Force mission requirements.

The Defense Department financial community, particularly as it prepares for the
Quadrennial Defense Review, may find this analysis insightful. We believe this research
may serve as a foundation for subsequent analyses on the effects base closures have on
the aggregate budget and may provide insight for similar analyses for the other services.

1.4. Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized into four major chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview
of the Cold War and its impact on the posture of the US military. Chapter 3 presents an
overview of BRAC, the costs and savings associated with its implementation, and items
for consideration for future rounds. The objective of Chapters 2 and 3 is to provide a
synopsis of the events that led to the US to maintain its largest standing military force
during peacetime, and the actions implemented to reduce the infrastructure during the
subsequent draw down at the end of the Cold War. Chapter 4 provides an explanation of
the research methodology used to address the research problem and results of the
analysis. The final chapter, Chapter 5, presents the conclusions of this thesis and
recommendations for future studies.

2. Effects of the Cold War

2.1. Introduction
"From the rise of the Iron Curtain in 1946 to the collapse of the Soviet empire in
1991," the nuclear arms race between the world's two superpowers had a looming impact
across the world [4]. Far-reaching political alliances and stringent economic sanctions
against communist countries resulted from this confrontation between military giants, but
perhaps the most significant effect of the war was the establishment of a large-standing
US military force during peacetime.
This chapter provides a brief overview of the Cold War, its effects on the US
military, and the transition of the armed forces to a post-Cold War posture after the
toppling of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the subsequent dissolve of the
USSR in 1991.

2.2. Cold War [3]
"Cold War", a term popularized by American journalist Walter Lippman, labels
the post-World War II struggle between the United States and its allies and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies from the mid-1940s until the late 1980s.
During this period, international politics were heavily shaped by the intense rivalry
between these two superpowers and the political ideologies they represented: democracy
and capitalism in the case of the United States and its allies, and communism in the case
of the Soviet bloc.
As victory in World War II was imminent for the Grand Alliance, the AmericanBritish-Soviet coalition, the United States and Soviets had a vast disagreement on the

make-up of the postwar world, particularly concerning the future of Poland. The USSR
believed Poland was vital to the security of the Soviet Union, and in 1946 and 1947
helped bring communist governments to power in Poland and the neighboring states of
Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.
As the impetus for the Cold War, this spread of communism under the leadership
of Josef Stalin caused relations between the USSR and its World War U allies (primarily
the United States, Britain, and France) to deteriorate to the point of war, although an
actual occurrence of warfare did not occur. Over the next few years, the emerging rivalry
between these two camps hardened into a mutual and permanent preoccupation. It
dominated the foreign policy agendas of both sides and led to the formation of two vast
military alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created by the
Western powers in 1949; and the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact, established in 1955.
Although centered originally in Europe, the Cold War enmity eventually drew the US and
the USSR into local conflicts in almost every quarter of the globe. It also produced what
became known as the "Cold War arms race", an intense competition between the two
superpowers to accumulate nuclear weapons.

2.3. Effects on the US Military Force Structure [8]
Throughout the Cold War, the US was guided by a national security strategy of
containment. It was a simple concept based on the idea that the centers of power for
communism were the Soviet Union, its satellites, and China. In the late 1940s and early
1950s, when this strategy was put into effect, the goal was to contain communism by
forming alliances and building military bases around these centers of power to prevent

them from physically expanding. This strategy forced a change in the familiar security
paradigm of the United States. When these installations were built around the world,
they could not be staffed them with people from the Guard and Reserve. For the first
time in peacetime, the US had to maintain a large-standing military force. The Defense
Department had to field large numbers of active-duty people—soldiers, sailors, airmen
and Marines—and have them forward deployed. These forces also required a large
support base and rotation pool in the United States.
The US military, however, has changed rather dramatically since the end of the
Cold War. In the late 1980s and early 1990s when we saw the Berlin Wall come down
(1989), the Warsaw Pact disintegrate (1991), and, eventually, the Soviet Union come
apart (1991), the US political leaders were far out in front of the military in recognizing
the momentous nature of these changes and the need to restructure the American military.
These events caused a shift in America's national priorities. Most notable to those
in the military were the decreases in the defense budgets and the beginning of what many
people called "downsizing". Some contend that these steps should have been
characterized as "demobilization". As a nation, the US has always had a militia mindset—we mobilize and use whatever resources are necessary to meet a challenge or to win
a war; and, when it's over, we demobilize (or in other words, significantly reduce our
standing military) and that's what really happened at the end of the Cold War.
Many Americans grew up with the massive military structure during the Cold
War. Many people came to believe the United States always had a large-standing
military force that was forward deployed, and this was the way things would always be.
However, this structure had to change because of the political shifts in Europe and the

Soviet Union that started in the late 1980s. President George H. W. Bush recognized the
nation needed a new national security strategy, and in the fall of 1990 he charged the
National Security Council with developing a post-Cold War strategy.
As this strategy was being developed, we began to bring troops back from
overseas bases. As we did so, we looked at several aspects of our forward presence
policy. First, we asked whether the function or mission the troops performed was still
required in the post-Cold War environment. If it was not required, then we disbanded the
units and demobilized those troops; if we thought the function or mission was required,
but could be placed with the Guard or Reserve because of a longer mobilization time,
then we did so. Troops would only be kept on active duty as a last resort. In the end, the
majority of these active units would be part of a contingency force based in the United
States. The military would have just enough forward presence to facilitate the
reintroduction of troops if they were required to provide humanitarian assistance, to aid
an ally, or to unilaterally defend some vital US interest.
As a result of this approach, the United States made some dramatic reductions in
the numbers of people in the armed forces. At the end of the Cold War, the US had 2.1
million men and women under arms in the active force. After this strategy development
process, the force was reduced to 1.4 million service members by October 1, 1995.

3. BRAC Overview

3.1. Introduction
As the Department of Defense postures itself to meet the fiscal and operational
challenges in the post-Cold War era, Joint Vision 2020, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), and the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) all point to the need for drastic,
continuous transformation in the Defense Department [5:5-11]. The Defense Department
firmly believes a major component of this period of transformation is its ability to close
installations that no longer hold value in the national defense strategy—a task
accomplished through the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. Specifically,
DoD contends that the ability to initiate two additional rounds of BRAC will promote the
effective and efficient use of the scarce fiscal resources prescribed by our civilian
leadership and provide savings to further sustain readiness and bolster a force of aging
weapons systems.
This chapter outlines the BRAC process, as well as the costs and savings reported
by DoD resulting from the initial four rounds. Additionally, this chapter provides an
overview of issues for consideration as DoD and Congress contemplate future rounds of
base closures.

3.2. Base Realignment and Closure: The DoD Perspective [5:3]
From the end of Vietnam until the late 1980s, congressional concern about the
potential loss of jobs in local communities resulted in very few bases being studied or
recommended for closure. These circumstances prevented DoD from adapting its base
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structure to the significant changes in forces, technologies, organizational structures, and
military doctrine. However, the end of he Cold War and the associated reductions in the
size of the military increased the number of installations that were candidates for closure
and realignment to a point where they could no longer be ignored.
To address this problem, Congress created the BRAC process, which works as
follows: DoD carefully evaluates and ranks each base according to a published plan for
the size of future military forces and to a published criteria, adopted through a rulemaking process prior to each round, starting with the 1991 round. The criteria have been
the same for each round and have included military value, return on investment,
environmental impact, and economic impact on the surrounding communities. The
Secretary of Defense then recommends to an independent BRAC Commission bases for
closure and realignment. The Commission, aided by the General Accounting Office,
performs a parallel, public review of these recommendations to ensure that they are,
indeed, consistent with the Department's force structure plan and selection criteria. The
Commission then submits its recommendations to the President. The President and
Congress must either accept these recommendations in total or reject the entire package.
Through its attributes of transparency, auditability, and independence, the BRAC
process has permitted both Congress and the President to support important but politically
painful adjustments in DoD's base structure.
The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act
of 1988 (BCRA 88, Title II of Pub. L. 100-526, 10 U.S.C. Section 2687 note), and the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (DBCRA 90, Part A of Title XXIX
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of Pub. L. 101-510, 10 U.S.C. Section 2687 note) list the requirements for identifying and
implementing domestic military base closures and realignments.
3.2.1. Overview of BRAC Implementation Costs [5]
BRAC implementation costs consist of the one-time expenses associated with the
overall base closure and realignment effort. The key characteristics of such costs are that
they are directly related to implementing a BRAC action; for example, they would not be
incurred except for the BRAC action. These costs represent the near-term investments
required to generate long-term BRAC savings. The Defense Department currently
estimates that implementing the four prior BRAC rounds will cost approximately $23
billion from 1988 through 2001.
Two separate budget accounts have been established for BRAC implementation
costs. The DoD Base Closure Account provides funding to implement BRAC 88 actions;
the DoD Base Closure Account 1990 provides funding to implement BRAC 91, 93, and
95 actions. Both accounts are part of DoD's overall budget for military construction,
though they pay for many BRAC-related activities in addition to construction, such as
relocating personnel and equipment and performing environmental remediation. The
BRAC budget accounts include the following categories of spending:
•
•

•

•

Military construction: New facilitates or alterations to existing facilities at the
gaining installations to accommodate the influx of equipment and personnel
Family Housing: Construction of new housing units
Operations and Maintenance: Established to pay for a variety of operation
and maintenance costs, such as severance pay for civilian employees, moving
costs for civilian employees who relocate, transportation of equipment, some
real property maintenance, and program management. BRAC accounts pay
for caretaker costs, but not facility-related operation and maintenance
activities prior to closure and the establishment of a caretaker regime
Military Personnel, Permanent Change of Station: BRAC accounts pay for
moving personnel and their dependents from closing and realigning bases to
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•

other installations. They also pay for travel, subsistence, and related costs of
temporary duty for these military personnel
Environmental Restoration: BRAC accounts fund environmental restoration.

The law requires DoD to complete implementation of each BRAC action within
six years of the date on which the President transmitted to the Congress the report that
approved the action. The Department begins to implement each BRAC round, and
therefore begins to incur the one-time implementation costs in the fiscal year immediately
following approval of the round, and continues to incur costs, until the end of the six-year
period. For example, DoD will incur costs for BRAC 95 from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal
year 2001.
In addition to the aforementioned costs, there are expenses incurred in support of
BRAC actions that are funded outside of the BRAC accounts. The categories of
expenses would include:
•

•
•
•

Economic assistance
■ DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment: Issues grants to help
communities affected by BRAC establish local organizations to plan
base reuse and to assist with their economic adjustment
■ Department of Labor: Assists displaced workers through counseling,
retraining, and job search assistance
■ Commerce Department's Economic Development Administration:
Provides grants to improve former bases' infrastructure as a means to
facilitate base reuse
■ Federal Aviation Administration: Issues grants to fund capital
improvements to convert former military airfields into new civilian
airports
Unemployment compensation
Early retirement and voluntary separation costs
Health care

These one-time costs indirectly associated with BRAC are considered to be small. As
noted in the Defense Department's 1998 BRAC Report, the costs imposed on other
government programs are less than five percent of BRAC implementation costs.
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3.2.2. Overview of BRAC Savings [5]
DoD defines savings as the difference between (1) what the Department would
have spent in the absence of the BRAC process to operate its base structure and (2) what
the Department actually spent (or plans to spend) for this function, plus gains in
efficiency that would not have been possible without BRAC.
BRAC creates savings because it permits DoD to avoid costs that it would have
incurred were it not for BRAC. First, BRAC saves base operating support costs, such as
the costs to "open the doors and turn on the lights". Second, BRAC saves other costs
because consolidation tends to increase efficiency. In the absence of the BRAC process,
the Department is effectively prohibited from gaining efficiencies through relocating and
consolidating major functions.
BRAC savings can be grouped into two categories: those that recur and those that
are one-time savings. Recurring savings would be those that represent permanent, ongoing reductions in planned spending, for example, personnel positions eliminated would
represent recurring savings. One-time savings include savings that do not recur year after
year, for example, cancelled military construction projects; one-time savings also take the
form of revenues generated from the lease or sale of properties.
Savings derived from BRAC do not represent direct reductions in DoD's annual
spending. Neither are they accumulated assets to be spent at some future time. Rather,
the reduction in expenditures associated with the realignment or closure of military
installations gives the Defense Department a way to meet budget targets and to fund
priority functions that it could not accommodate in the absence of BRAC-related
economies. Furthermore, budgetary adjustments for expected BRAC savings are made as
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part of the normal planning, program, and budgeting system (PPBS) process. No audit
trail, single document, or budget account exists for tracking the end use of each dollar
saved through BRAC.
It has been DoD's policy to allow the Military Departments to retain and
reallocate their BRAC savings. After BRAC recommendations are approved, each
Military Department applies the estimated savings to its long-term spending plans and
uses them to fund higher priorities.

3.3. The Need for Additional Closures
"Today, the US military finds itself operating at an intense pace around the
globe—more so than at any peacetime in our history. But defense spending has been
declining in real terms every year since 1985, and military planners assume that this
decline will continue for the foreseeable future" [10]. Since the height of the Cold War,
the defense budget has been reduced by approximately 40 percent, overall force structure
has been reduced by 36 percent, and procurement had decreased by almost 70 percent;
yet, during the same period, the number of domestic bases has dropped only 21 percent
[2; 7].
Based on the findings in the DoD BRAC Report, after the on-going closure and
realignment efforts resulting from the four previous rounds of BRAC are complete in
2001, the Department will still have more bases than are needed to support our nation's
military forces [5:i]. Moreover, maintaining and operating an inert base structure that is
larger than necessary has broad consequences for the Department; these consequences
fall into two categories [5:ii, 2]:
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Strategie. New BRAC rounds are of fundamental importance to our defense
strategy. Without new BRAC rounds, DoD will not be able to implement the
strategy outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review. In the absence of
BRAC, DoD will have to decide whether to reduce force structure, delay the
introduction of more modern weapons for our troops, or reduce funding for
quality of life.
Financial. DoD wastes money operating and maintaining bases that are not
essential to national defense. Future BRAC rounds will enable the
Department to generate savings by eliminating existing excess capacity and
use those resources to maintain readiness and modernize our forces. BRAC
will also help eliminate the additional excess capacity created as DoD
reengineers business practices and consolidates organizations.

3.4. The GAO Perspective on BRAC Savings
As the investigative arm of Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has
reviewed the costs and savings reported by DoD. Upon review of DoD's claims, GAO
suggests that ambiguous costs and savings estimates, inferior accounting systems, and
mounting environmental cleanup costs have tainted DoD's ability to present more
accurate cost and savings information as they apply to BRAC.
Changes and uncertainties regarding BRAC implementation costs and savings
have been caused by a variety of factors, beginning with how the estimates were initially
calculated and later updated or tracked.
DoD derived initial BRAC cost and savings estimates from the Cost of
Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model, which was used in each of
the past four BRAC rounds to develop comparative costs of alternative
actions. This model, while useful for initial BRAC decision-making, was
not intended to produce budget quality data and was not used to develop
the cost estimates in the budgets for implementing BRAC decisions
[14:24-25].
Data developed for the budget submissions differ from those in COBRA for a
variety of reasons, including the following [15:38-39]:
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•
•
•
•

Some factors in COBRA estimates are averages, where budget data are more
specific.
COBRA costs are expressed in constant-year dollars; budgets are expressed in
inflated dollars.
Environmental restoration costs are not included in COBRA estimates, but these
costs are included in BRAC implementation budgets.
COBRA estimates show costs and savings pertinent to a given installation even if
multiple tenants are involved; BRAC implementation budgets represent only a
single component's costs.

Furthermore, the estimates for savings have not been developed consistently across the
services. "The Army and the Navy did not use the model to develop the savings
estimates that were reported in DoD's budget justifications for the BRAC accounts, while
the Air Force used the COBRA estimates, with adjustments for inflation and recurring
cost increases at gaining bases, as the basis for developing its savings estimates" [14:2425].
Figure 1 further illustrates the factors that have made it difficult to fully identify
and track savings from closures or led to changing estimates of costs over time which
affected when savings would begin to offset the costs [14:24].
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Figure 1. Why BRAC Savings are Difficult to Track
and Estimates Change Over Time

A fundamental limitation in DoD's ability to identify and track savings
from BRAC closures and realignments is that DoD's accounting systems,
like all accounting systems, are oriented to tracking expenses and
disbursements, not savings. Savings estimates are developed by the
services at the time they are developing their initial BRAC implementation
budgets and are reported in DoD's BRAC budget justifications. Because
the accounting systems do not track savings, updating these estimates
requires a separate data tracking system. The lack of updates is
problematic because the initial estimates are based on forecasted data that
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can change during actual implementation, thereby increasing or decreasing
the amount of savings [14:25-26].
Moreover, "DoD cannot provide accurate information on the actual savings because (1)
information on base support cost was not retained for some closing bases and (2) the
services' accounting systems cannot isolate the effect on support costs at gaining bases"
[13:4]. In spite of the criticism the Department has received from its inability to
accurately identify and track savings from BRAC actions, DoD officials state that
designing and implementing a system for collecting actual savings information would be
difficult and extremely expensive, and they questioned the value of such a system [13:4].
In addition to the nebulous estimates and inferior accounting systems, the costs of
implementing BRAC recommendations have been greater than DoD originally estimated.
Land sale revenues were less than projected, particularly in the earlier rounds, and
environmental cleanup costs are significantly higher—by the end of the legislated BRAC
implementation period, it is expected that DoD will have spent over $7.2 billion dollars in
environmental costs, with an additional estimate of $2.4 billion to continue beyond fiscal
year 2001 [15:6]. The key factors contributing to the mounting cost of cleanup are (1)
the number of contaminated sites and difficulties associated with certain types of
contamination, (2) the requirements of federal and state laws and regulations, (3) the lack
of cost-effective cleanup technology, and (4) the intended property reuse [12:9].
Additionally, as DoD retains hundreds of thousands of acres until the property is able to
meet transfer requirements, costs associated with a caretaker force continue to
accumulate for the Department, ultimately lessening overall BRAC savings.
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3.5. Cost Savings Versus Cost Avoidance
The General Accounting Office claims, "despite the imprecision associated with
DoD's cost and savings estimates, our analysis continues to show that BRAC actions will
result in substantial long-term savings after the cost of closing and realigning bases are
incurred" [15:43]. As reported by the General Accounting Office, there is evidence
indicating that the long-term savings that BRAC will generate, as a result of creating
economies through the reduction of excess infrastructure, should be substantial. Though,
it must be noted that the "savings" claimed by DoD are cost avoidance. It is important to
note the distinction between cost savings and cost avoidance: cost savings are simply
cost reductions from an approved budget that result in program funds being recouped or
used elsewhere, and cost avoidances are the avoidance of costs that have not been
budgeted [14:6].
As reported in the DoD fiscal year 1999 BRAC budget submission, the net
cumulative savings from all four rounds through fiscal year 2001 should be
approximately $14 billion, as shown in Table 1; however, because a majority of the
savings occur after the six-year BRAC/FYDP implementation period, they would be
more along the lines of cost avoidance as opposed to direct FYDP adjustments [1:8;
15:37].

20

Table 1. DoD FY 1999 BRAC Budget Submission
$ Billions

Round
BRAC 88
BRAC 91
BRAC 93
BRAC 95
Total

6-Year
Period
1990-1995
1992-1997
1994-1999
1996-2001

Costs
$2.7
5.2
7.7
7.3
$22.9

Savings
$2.4
6.4
7.5
5.9
$22.2

Net annual
recurring
savings
$0.8
1.5
2.1
1.3
$5.7

Total
savings
through
2001
$6.9
12.4
11.7
5.9
$36.9

Net savings
through
2001
$4.2
7.2
4.0
(1.4)
$14.0

In the absence of a definitive explanation of the savings generated by the first four
rounds, Congress is wary of authorizing the additional rounds requested by the SECDEF
and the services.

3.6. Analysis of Air Force BRAC Savings
There have been many inferences about the savings within DoD being tied
directly to the number of installations. However, previous studies on the savings,
specifically the Air Force savings illustrated in the report for the Deputy Assistant
Secretary (Cost and Economics), Financial Management, SAF/FMC, indicate a majority
of the savings have been related to personnel cuts that resulted from decreased mission
requirements. Of the Air Force savings attributed to BRAC, 86.7 percent of the total
savings were resultant of reduction in personnel (53.79 percent from military personnel
and 32.96 percent from civilian personnel), as highlighted by Table 2 [1:11].
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Table 2. Financial Summary of all four BRAC rounds
US Department of the Air Force
$ Millions
FY90-FY01
COSTS
One time implementation costs

$5,811

Implementation costs outside of BRAC account

310

Sub-total

$6,121

Military construction

$504

Family Housing Construction

70

Family Housing Operation

242

Operations & Maintenance

2,030

Military Personnel

3,313

Sub-total

$6,159

NET IMPLEMENTATION COSTS (+); SAVLNGS(-)

$-38

Personnel-related Savings (O&M/ MilPers)

$5,343

Total Savings Credited to BRAC

$6,159

Personnel Savings/ Total Savings

86.7%

SAVINGS

Based on this analysis presented in the SAF/FMC report, it would appear logical
to evaluate the impact of the service members on the budget, in addition to the other
surrogate measures for the Air Force mission requirements—number of aircraft and
number of flying hours.
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3.7. Summary
Undoubtedly, as the Defense Department prepares itself for the challenges of
addressing new threats and retaining its posture as a dominant military power in the postCold War era, it is presumed that base closures will play a major role in reshaping our
domestic infrastructure to eliminate installations that no longer hold military value, thus
promoting more efficient use of military resources. Former Defense Secretary William
Cohen emphasizes this in his cover letter in the April 1998 Office of the Secretary of
Defense report, The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Closure:
BRAC is critical to the success of our defense strategy. Without BRAC,
we will not have the resources needed to maintain high readiness and buy
the next generation of equipment needed to ensure our dominance in
future conflicts [5].
In the absence of viable cost and savings data, however, it is difficult to
substantiate the savings attributed to BRAC and provide definitive data to Congress as
they consider future rounds. "Key requirements for calculating actual BRAC savings
include information on decreased support costs at closing bases and the offsetting
increases at gaining bases" [13:4]. (Note: The February 1992 DoD Base Structure
Report defined base support costs as "the overhead cost of providing, operating, and
maintaining the defense base structure, including real property, base operations costs, and
family housing costs" [13:24].) As noted by GAO, DoD's inferior accounting systems,
coupled with highly aggregated fiscal data, make it difficult to determine savings with
any degree of certainty. Therefore this study will conduct research to determine whether
changes in the aggregate budgets support the claim that closing major installations
produces significant savings. Air Force data will be used for this research.
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To evaluate the impact of each major installation, we will use regression to
determine if a statistically significant relationship could be modeled between the number
of installations and the budgets for the six appropriations. Subsequently, surrogate
measures for the Air Force mission requirements will be used to determine if a
mathematical relationship exists and if it provides a better measure than the number of
installations.
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4. Analysis of BRAC Savings

4.1. Introduction
To evaluate the potential savings of closing major installations, one should
evaluate the monetary contribution of the number of installations to the budget. This
research tests whether the number of major installations drives the Air Force budgets.
We test the impact of the number of installations alone and along with measures of Air
Force mission requirements. Ultimately, we compare the results of the individual
analyses to determine which measure provides a more reasonable and justifiable
statistical relationship with regards to claimed savings.

4.2. Statistical Analysis
This study employs regression using the Excel Data Analysis (Analysis ToolPak)
add-in to evaluate the hypothesis that the budgets of the six Air Force appropriations can
be explained with the number of major installations and surrogate variables for the Air
Force mission level. The resulting descriptive models should provide insight into how
the number of major installations and the Air Force mission requirements, as explained
by the surrogate measures, can explain the appropriation budgets.
There are several overarching assumptions that were imposed for this analysis:
1. The number of active duty personnel, total number of aircraft, or flying
hours is a surrogate measure for Air Force mission requirements.
2. Significant post-Cold War active duty personnel reductions are the result
of reducing the Air Force mission level, as opposed to being driven by
BRAC actions.
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To test the research assumptions, we use major installations and three surrogate measures
for Air Force mission requirements.
4.2.1. Regression Variables
As the Defense Department continues to contemplate two additional rounds of
base closings, the focus continues to be on closing major installations. The Air Force
defines major installations as Air Force Bases, Air Bases, Air Reserves Bases, and Air
Guard Bases, that are self-supporting centers of operations for actions of importance to
Air Force combat, combat support, or training. Each of the major installations is
occupied by a unit of group size or larger with all land, facilities, and organic support
needed to accomplish the unit mission.
Consistent with DoD objectives, we focused our research on identifying the
impact of major installations on the Air Force budget. We did consider using minor
installations for further analysis, however, we were unable to find a source for the
number of minor installations using the current Air Force criteria for base classifications
as discussed in Appendix B.
To test whether major installations or mission level drives the Air Force budgets,
this research also considers the impact of surrogate measures for Air Force mission
requirements:
This research hypothesizes that the conclusion of the Cold War led to the decline
in the Air Force mission level, which subsequently led to significant reductions in the
number of personnel on active duty. Moreover, the S AF/FMC report implies a causal
link between the mission level and the number of active duty personnel and that the
overwhelming majority of savings attributed to BRAC are actually from personnel
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reductions [1:7]. To test this theory, we use active duty Air Force members as a
surrogate measure of the mission requirements.
Air Force mission requirements also dictate the operations tempo. DoD defines
operations tempo as "a measure of the pace of an operation or operations in terms of
equipment usage—aircraft 'flying hours,' ship 'steaming days,' or 'tank (driving)
miles'" [9]. Consistent with the Defense Department's definition, this research uses both
the number of aircraft and the number of flying hours as surrogate measures of Air Force
mission requirements.
This research also uses fiscal years based on the supposition that each subsequent
budget is based primarily from previous year's requirements.
4.2.2. Data
To accomplish the task of building descriptive models, historical budgets for
fiscal years 1960 - 2000 were obtained from the Automated Budget Interactive Data
Environment System (ABIDES) database. To overcome current-year dollar distortion
and to allow for year-to-year comparisons, the fiscal data was recalculated into constant
fiscal year 2001 dollars.
In the absence of an all inclusive database for both fiscal and explanatory
variables, the annual Almanac editions of the Air Force Magazine, from May 1973 2000, were used to create a database of major installations, active duty Air Force
members, number of aircraft, and number of flying hours. In the five instances where
data were missing (4 years for flying hours and 1 year for number of aircraft), we used
mathematical interpolation to estimate the values.
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The final database includes complete data from 1964, 1968, and 1972 - 2000, as
shown in Appendix C.
We determined the number of major installations was highly correlated with the
number of active duty Air Force members, number of aircraft, and number of flying
hours, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Correlation of Independent Variables

Active Duty Air
Force
Major
Installations
Aircraft
Flying Hours

Active Duty
Air Force

Major
Installations

1.00

.97

.97

.95

.97

1.00

.96

.92

.97

.96

1.00

.94

.95

.92

.94

1.00

Aircraft

F1 t

Hours

Based on the significant level of correlation, multicollinearity, an instance when
two or more independent variables used in a model contribute redundant information,
exists if more than one of the variables is included. Furthermore, these high correlations
among mission-related variables and the number of major installations may obfuscate the
impact of closing bases. Therefore, we expect that either major installations or one of the
surrogate measures is the best explanatory variable.
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Based on the identified variables and the available data, the proposed model
relating the appropriation budgets to the independent variable, major installations or one
of the mission level surrogate variables, is
y = ßo + ßiXi + ß2x2+£
where
y = appropriation for the respective budget
xi = fiscal year
x2 = number of major installations or surrogate mission requirement variable
s = error term

4.3. Final Results
For each of Air Force's appropriations, to include the overall total, the budgets
were regressed on major installations. Subsequently, the appropriations were regressed
with each of the surrogate measures—active duty Air Force members, number of aircraft,
and number of flying hours—to determine which one provided the best fit; "best" defined
as the highest coefficient of determination, or R2 statistic. Finally, we compare the
regression of the respective budgets based on major installations and the best regression
based on surrogate mission-level variable to determine which model provides a better fit
to the budget data.
It is important to note that variables with negative coefficients or those with a pvalue of more than .05 were determined to be "statistically insignificant."
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4.3.1. Operations and Maintenance Appropriation
We regressed the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation
budget with fiscal years and major installations. The Excel regression routine produced
the results shown in Table 4 and Figure 2.

Table 4. O&M Regression Results (FY-Major Installations)
Regression Statistics
0.7346586
0.5397233
0.5068463
2.312E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
Major

Coefficients
-1.05E+12
533906490
176971606

Standard Error
1.97E+11
97470776
31326628

P-value
1.07E-05
7.53E-06
4.72E-06

$40,000,000,000
$35,000,000,000
$30,000,000,000
</>■ $25,000,000,000
O

$20,000,000,000

U.

$15,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$5,000,000,000
$0
•<tcM-'*coa>oc'a->tcD929£'2t-_~,_
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Fiscal Year
•Actual

FY-MAJ

Figure 2. O&M Appropriation regressed by FY and Major Installations
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As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 54.0 percent of the
variability within the O&M budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal year the
O&M budget increases by $533.9 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) and the average
budget per major installation is $177.0 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars). Based on
these results, an argument could be made that closing bases saves fiscal resources.
We also regressed the O&M appropriation budget with fiscal years and all of the
surrogate measures for the Air Force mission—active duty Air Force members provided
the best fit as indicated by the R2 statistic. The Excel regression routine produced the
results shown in Table 5 and Figure 3.

Table 5. O&M Regression Results (FY-ADAF)
Regression Statistics
0.7978287
0.6365306
0.6105685
2.054E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
ADAF

Standard Error
1.95E+11
96607532
7080.094

Coefficients
-1.3E+12
653766989
48986.641
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P-value
3.36E-07
2.38E-07
1.61E-07

$40,000,000,000
$35,000,000,000
$30,000,000,000
<ä- $25,000,000,000

^^^^^J^k^t

O $20,000,000,000
LL

$15,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$5,000,000,000
$0

■*c\i"*cocooc\i-'*coooo2J'tfcgcog
coNi^-h-r^coooa3coooo505cn030)0
0)0>0>0>0>050>CDO>0>0503CnO>0)0

Fiscal Year
FY-ADAF

Actual

FY-MAJ

Figure 3. O&M Appropriation regressed by FY and ADAF

As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 63.7 percent of the
variability within the O&M budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal year the
O&M budget increases by $653.8 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) and each Air Force
member contributes an average of $49.0 thousand (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) to the
budget.
The results illustrate a stronger correlation between the O&M budget and the
number of active duty Air Force members when compared to the relation between the
numbers of major installations. Furthermore, this analysis supports the idea that reducing
the number of active duty Air Force members, as opposed to closing major installations,
is the impetus for saving O&M expenses.
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4.3.2. Military Construction Appropriation
We regressed the Military Construction (MILCON) appropriation budget with
fiscal years and major installations. The Excel regression routine produced the results
shown in Table 6 and Figure 4.

Table 6. MILCON Regression Results (FY-Major Installations)
Regression Statistics
0.500899
0.2509
0.197393
4.95E+08
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
Major

Coefficients
-5.7E+10
28177578
16384385

Standard Error
4.23E+10
20889770
6713869

P-value
0.191972
0.188188
0.021256

$3,000,000,000
$2,500,000,000
^ $2,000,000,000
O

$1,500,000,000

"■

$1,000,000,000
$500,000,000
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Fiscal Year
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Figure 4. MILCON Appropriation regressed by FY and Major Installations
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As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 25.1 percent of the
variability within the MILCON budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal year the
MILCON budget increases by $28.2 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) and the average
budget per major installation is $16.4 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars). Based on
these results, an argument could be made that closing bases saves fiscal resources. (Note:
As indicated by the p-values for the intercept and fiscal year, this regression model is
significantly insignificant; however, it is presented to compare with the results of the
model using the surrogate measure.)
We also regressed the MILCON appropriation budget with fiscal years and all of
the surrogate measures for the Air Force mission—active duty Air Force members
provided the best fit as indicated by the R2 statistic. The Excel regression routine
produced the results shown in Table 7 and Figure 5:

Table 7. MILCON Regression Results (FY-ADAF)
Regression Statistics
0.607323
0.368841
0.323758
4.55E+08
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
ADAF

Coefficients
-1E+11
51286519
5497.11

Standard Error
4.32E+10
21386785
1567.377
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P-value
0.023957
0.023392
0.001547
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Figure 5. MILCON Appropriation regressed by FY and ADAF

As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 36.9 percent of the
variability within the MILCON budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal year the
MILCON budget increases by $51.3 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) and each Air
Force member contributes an average of $5.5 thousand (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) to the
budget. Ultimately, this analysis supports the assumption that BRAC does not save
MILCON expenses; reducing the number of active duty Air Force members does.
4.3.3. Military Personnel Appropriation
We regressed the Military Personnel (Mil Pers) appropriation budget with fiscal
years and major installations. The Excel regression routine produced the results shown in
Table 8 and Figure 6.
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Table 8. Mil Pers Regression Results (FY-Major Installations)
Regressioni Statistics
0.8929674
0.7973907
0.7829186
2.313E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adiusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
Major

M
g
>"-

Coefficients
-1.02E+12
509592314
274512024
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Figure 6. Mil Pers Appropriation regressed by FY and Major Installations

As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 79.7 percent of the
variability within the Mil Pers budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal year the
Mil Pers budget increases by $509.6 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) and the average
budget per major installation is $274.5 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars). Based on
these results, an argument could be made that closing bases would produce savings.
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We also regressed the Mil Pers appropriation budget with fiscal years and all of
the surrogate measures for the Air Force mission—active duty Air Force members
provided the best fit as indicated by the R2 statistic. The Excel regression routine
produced the results shown in Table 9 and Figure 7.

Table 9. Mil Pers Regression Results (FY-ADAF)
Regression Statistics
0.9188878

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
ADAF

0.8443548
0.8332373

2.027E+09
31

Coefficients
-1.31E+12
654598674
72710.012
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Figure 7. Mil Pers Appropriation regressed by FY and ADAF
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As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 84.4 percent of the
variability within the Mil Pers budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal year the
Mil Pers budget increases by $654.6 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) and each Air
Force member contributes an average of $72.7 thousand (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) to
the budget. Our analysis supports the premise that reducing the number of active duty
Air Force members, as opposed to BRAC, saves Mil Pers expenses.
4.3.4. Military Family Housing Appropriation
We regressed the Military Family Housing appropriation budget with fiscal years
and major installations. The Excel regression routine produced the results shown in
Table 10 and Figure 8.

Table 10. Family Housing Regression Results (FY-Major Installations)
Regression Statistics
0.909255
0.826744
0.814369
1.73E+08
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
Major

Coefficients
-1.2E+11
58270119
7885578

Standard Error
1.48E+10
7313738
2350599
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P-value
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Figure 8. Family Housing Appropriation regressed by FY and Major Installations

As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 82.7 percent of the
variability within the Family Housing budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal
year the Family Housing budget increases by $58.3 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars)
and the average budget per major installation is $7.9 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars).
Based on these results, an argument could be made that closing bases saves fiscal
resources.
We also regressed the Family Housing appropriation budget with fiscal years and
all of the surrogate measures for the Air Force mission—active duty Air Force members
provided the best fit as indicated by the R2 statistic. The Excel regression routine
produced the results shown in Table 11 and Figure 9.
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Table 11. Family Housing Regression Results (FY-ADAF)
Regression Statistics
0.9186667
0.8439486
0.8328021
164631342
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
ADAF

Coefficients
-1.28E+11
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2239.6404

Standard Error
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567.3739

P-value
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Figure 9. Family Housing Appropriation regressed by FY and ADAF

As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 84.4 percent of the
variability within the Family Housing budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal
year the Family Housing budget increases by $64.3 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars)
and each Air Force member contributes an average of $2.2 thousand (in fiscal year 2001
dollars) to the budget. Ultimately, this analysis supports the theory that BRAC does not
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save Family Housing expenses, reducing the number of active duty Air Force members
does.
4.3.5. Research and Development Appropriation
We regressed the Research and Development (R&D) appropriation budget with
fiscal years and major installations. The Excel regression routine produced the results
shown in Table 12 and Figure 10.

Table 12. R&D Regression Results (FY-Major Installations)
Regression Statistics
0.776318
0.60267
0.57429
2.27E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
Major

Coefficients
-1.2E+12
6.21E+08
1.84E+08

Standard Error
1.93E+11
95525092
30701294
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P-value
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4.77E-07
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Figure 10. R&D Appropriation regressed by FY and Major Installations

As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 60.3 percent of the
variability within the R&D budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal year the
R&D budget increases by $621.3 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) and the average
budget per major installation is $184.0 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars). Based on
these results, an argument could be made that closing bases saves fiscal resources.
We also regressed the R&D appropriation budget with fiscal years and all of the
surrogate measures for the Air Force mission—active duty Air Force members provided
the best fit as indicated by the R2 statistic. The Excel regression routine produced the
results shown in Table 13 and Figure 11.
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Table 13. R&D Regression Results (FY-ADAF)
Regression Statistics
0.865066
0.748339
0.730364
1.8E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
ADAF

Coefficients
-1.5E+12
7.73E+08
53067.07

Standard Error
1.71E+11
84793339
6214.265

P-value
8.66E-10
7.21E-10
2.78E-09
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Figure 11. R&D Appropriation regressed by FY and ADAF

As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 74.8 percent of the
variability within the R&D budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal year the
R&D budget increases by $772.6 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) and each Air Force
member contributes an average of $53.1 thousand (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) to the
budget. Consistent with the results from the other appropriations, this analysis supports
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the idea that reducing the Air Force mission, as defined by the surrogate measure, saves
R&D expenses rather than closing major installations.
4.3.6. Procurement Appropriation
We regressed the Procurement appropriation budget with fiscal years and major
installations. The Excel regression routine produced the results shown in Table 14 and
Figure 12.

Table 14. Procurement Regression Results (FY-Major Installations)
Regressiont Statistics
0.5964457
0.3557474
0.3097294
9.728E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
Major

Coefficients
-2.22E+12
1.1E+09
486120971

Standard Error
8.3E+11
4.1E+08
1.32E+08
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P-value
0.012372
0.012141
0.000964
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Figure 12. Procurement Appropriation regressed by FY and Major Installations

As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 35.6 percent of the
variability within the Procurement budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal year
the Procurement budget increases by $1.1 billion (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) and the
average budget per major installation is $486.1 million (in fiscal year 2001 dollars).
Based on these results, an argument could be made that closing bases saves fiscal
resources.
We also regressed the Procurement appropriation budget with fiscal years and all
of the surrogate measures for the Air Force mission—active duty Air Force members
provided the best fit as indicated by the R2 statistic. The Excel regression routine
produced the results shown in Table 15 and Figure 13.

45

Table 15. Procurement Regression Results (FY-ADAF)
Regressiont Statistics
0.75049717
0.56324601
0.53204929
8009329955
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
ADAF

Coefficients
-3.513E+12
1739855078
159440.649
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Figure 13. Procurement Appropriation regressed by FY and ADAF

As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 56.3 percent of the
variability within the Procurement budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal year
the Procurement budget increases by $1.7 billion (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) and each
Air Force member contributes an average of $159.4 thousand (in fiscal year 2001 dollars)
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to the budget. This analysis supports our claim that BRAC does not save Procurement
expenses, reducing the Air Force mission does.
4.3.7. Total Air Force Appropriation
We regressed the total Air Force appropriation budget with fiscal years and major
installations. The Excel regression routine produced the results shown in Table 16 and
Figure 14.

Table 16. Total Air Force Regression Results (FY-Major Installations)
Regressioni Statistics
0.739483
0.546835
0.514466
1.32E+10
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
Major

Coefficients
-6.2E+12
3.1E+09
1.03E+09

Standard Error
1.13E+12
5.57E+08
1.79E+08

47

P-value
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Figure 14. Total Air Force Appropriation regressed by FY and Major Installations

As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 54.9 percent of the
variability within the total Air Force budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal
year the Total budget increases by $3.1 billion (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) and the
average budget per major installation is $1.0 billion (in fiscal year 2001 dollars). Based
on these results, an argument could be made that closing bases saves fiscal resources.
We also regressed the total Air Force appropriation budget with fiscal years and
all of the surrogate measures for the Air Force mission—active duty Air Force members
provided the best fit as indicated by the R2 statistic. The Excel regression routine
produced the results shown in Table 17 and Figure 15.
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Table 17. Total Air Force Regression Results (FY-ADAF)
Regression Statistics
0.898113
0.806607
0.792793
8.64E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
FY
ADAF

Standard Error
8.21E+11
4.06E+08
29761.37

Coefficients
-8.5E+12
4.22E+09
318481

P-value
5.03E-11
4.01E-11
2.11E-11
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Figure 15. Total Air Force Appropriation regressed by FY and ADAF
As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 80.7 percent of the
variability within the total Air Force budget. The coefficients indicate that each fiscal
year the Total budget increases by $4.2 billion (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) and each Air
Force member contributes an average of $318.5 thousand (in fiscal year 2001 dollars) to
the budget. Ultimately, this analysis supports the theory that curtailing the Air Force
mission is the driving factor behind reducing the budget rather than BRAC.
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4.4. Summary
Based on the results of the regression models, summarized in Table 18 and
presented in detail in Appendices D-J, there is significant evidence that the mission
requirement surrogate measure, active duty Air Force members, serves as a better
explanatory variable for the respective appropriation budgets and the overall Air Force
budget when compared to the number of major installations. This conclusion would
refute the idea that closing bases, in and of themselves, is the impetus for generating
substantial savings.

Table 18. Summary of Regression Analyses

Appropriation
O&M
MILCON
Mil Pers
Family Housing
R&D
Procurement
Total

MAJOR INSTALLATION MODEL
Coefficients (in millions)
Major
FY
Intercept
$177.0
$533.9
-$1,054,762.0
$16.4
$28.2
-$56,500.1
$274.5
$509.6
-$1,021,363.9
$7.9
$58.3
-$115,830.9
$184.0
$621.3
-$1,243,340.5
$486.1
$1,099.9
-$2,218,359.4
$1,026.2
$3,098.8
.-$6,181,316.8

R2
54.0%
25.1%
79.7%
82.7%
60.3%
35.6%
54.7%

Appropriation
O&M
MILCON
Mil Pers
Family Housing
R&D
Procurement
Total

ACTIVE DUTY AIR FORCE MODEL
Coefficients (in millions)
FY
ADAF
Intercept
$0.0490
$653.8
-$1,296,390.0
$0.0055
$51.3
-$103,245.2
$0.0727
$654.6
-$1,313,140.2
$0.0022
$64.3
-$128,038.8
$0.0531
$772.6
-$1,548,604.6
$0.1594
$1,739.9
-$3,512,591.0
$0.3185
$4,223.8
-$8,454,866.8

R2
63.7%
36.9%
84.4%
84.4%
74.8%
56.3%
80.7%
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We further deduce that substantial savings can be generated when the Air Force
reduces its mission, and the reduction in mission requirements promotes reducing the
number of active duty Air Force members; we do not expect transferring requirements to
civilian employees or contractors would constitute a reduction in the mission. This
reduction in the number of active duty Air Force members due to a scaled-down mission
would support the argument for additional rounds of BRAC. We test this supposition by
regressing major installations with the number of active duty Air Force members.

Tne

Excel regression routine produced the results shown in Table 19 and Figure 16; the
detailed results are presented in Appendix K.

Table 19. ADAF and Major Installation Regression Results
Regression Statistics
0.968159
0.937333
0.903999
7.506573
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Intercept
ADAF

Coefficients
0
0.000238

Standard Error
#N/A
2.36E-06
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P-value
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Figure 16. Major Installations regressed by ADAF

As indicated by the R2 statistic, this model accounts for 93.7 percent of the
variability within the number of major installations. The coefficient indicates that each
active duty Air Force member accounts for .000238 of a major installation—in other
words, approximately 4202 active duty Air Force members would make up one major
installation. We can conclude that a reduction in the mission resulting in the elimination
of approximately 4202 active duty Air Force members would support the closure of one
major installation.
The Air Force decreased from 576,446 active duty members in fiscal year 1988 to
357,777 airmen in fiscal year 2000. This reduction of 218,669 members constitutes a
37.9 percent decrease. During this same period, the number of major installations
decreased from 140 to 87, which is also a 37.9 percent reduction. Under the assumption
that the number of active duty Air Force members determines the number of major
installations, the Air Force has already closed the appropriate number of major
installations.
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5. Conclusions

5.1. Summary of Research
We analyzed the savings resulting from the previous four rounds of BRAC in
terms of their affect on each of the budget appropriations. For each appropriation, while
the number of major installations initially appears to be a significant determinant in
explaining the change in the budget, the number of bases becomes insignificant if a
surrogate for Air Force mission requirements is included as the explanatory variable. We
tested three surrogate measures for mission requirements: number of flying hours,
number of aircraft, and number of active duty personnel. In each case, we found the
number of active duty Air Force members to be a better predictor of the budget level than
the regression model that included the number of major installations. We conclude that
mission requirements are a better indicator of the required funding than the number of
major installations.
Additionally, we analyzed the statistical relationship between the number of
major installations and the number of active duty Air Force members. We found that the
number of active duty Air Force members is an excellent predictor for the number of
major installations—on average, 4,202 active duty Air Force members would equate to
one major installation.

5.2. Suggestions for Further Research
We present four topics for potential future investigation.
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5.2.1. Effects of Other Variables
Subsequent research on the costs and savings derived from BRAC may consider
other dependent variables. Some additional potential influences may be the effects of
flying vs. non-flying wings (particularly space oriented units), major vs. minor
installations, the number of aircraft by type (fighter, bomber, cargo), and the number of
Guard and Reserve Personnel. These mission-related variables, or a combination of
them, may provide better indications of the Air Force mission requirements.
5.2.2. Impact of Competitive Sourcing
The 1999 FYDP was the first to reflect savings from DoD's Defense
Reform Initiative (DRI). The intention of the DRI was to change how
DoD does business internally and with the private sector. The DRI has
four basic tenets: (1) reduce excess infrastructure and redundancies, (2)
adopt modern business practices to achieve world class standards of
performance and continue to reform the acquisition process, (3) streamline
organizations to remove redundancies and maximize synergy, and (4)
expand the use of competition between the public and private sectors to
improve performance and reduce the cost of DoD business and support
activities. Quantifiable long-term savings to pay for future modernization
have been estimated for only two initiatives: public/private competitions
(competitive sourcing) and base realignment and closures [11:32-33].
It is conceivable that as DoD exercises the option to competitively source
traditionally organic functions, and those functions are carried out at the contractors'
facilities, military and civilian positions may be eliminated and provide additional
opportunities to close military installations.
5.2.3. Impact of Interservice BRAC Actions
As noted by the SAF/FMC report, savings attributed to Air Force personnel cuts
averaged 86.7 percent of the total BRAC savings—the ratio increased from 78 percent in
BRAC 88 to 99 percent in BRAC 95 [1:7]. "By contrast actual dollar amounts for nonpersonnel savings in each BRAC round decline from a high of $403 million in BRAC 91
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to just $7 million in BRAC 95. Should relatively large personnel savings of the past not
reoccur in the future, then it would remain to be seen how the Air Force would achieve
necessary savings to offset likely closure costs" [1:7]. The report further argues "future
rounds of BRAC are more likely to be concentrated in areas other than operational and
training activities, and may be less likely to be accompanied by significant personnel
reductions even in support areas" [1:8].
In line with the SAF/FMC report, the GAO believes future rounds of BRAC will
focus on non-operational installations and savings will have to be attained in the absence
of intraservice personnel cuts. In its 1997 compilation of lessons learned from prior
rounds, the GAO emphasizes the need for interservice BRAC actions in order realize
significant savings from the elimination of any additional excess infrastructure:
Despite these recent BRAC rounds, DoD continues to maintain large
amounts of excess infrastructure, especially in its support functions, such
as maintenance depots, research and development laboratories, and test
and evaluation centers. Each service maintains its own facilities and
capabilities for performing many common support functions and, as a
result, DoD has overlapping, redundant, and underutilized infrastructure.
DoD has taken some steps to demolish unneeded buildings on various
operational and support bases; consolidate certain functions; privatize,
outsource, and reengineer certain workloads; and encourage
interservicing agreements—however, these are not expected to offset the
need for additional actions. At the same time, DoD officials recognize
that significant additional reductions in excess infrastructure requirements
in common support areas could come from consolidating workloads and
restructuring functions on a cross-service basis, something that has not
been accomplished to any great extent in prior BRAC rounds. [97-151:3]
At the very least, consideration needs to be given to the development of a joint
service position outlining how the services will determine the installations to close and
realign, and the development of a uniform methodology to estimate costs and savings.
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5.2.4. Facility Thinning
Since the draw down in the 1990s, there has been inverse effect between the
number of people on active duty and the amount of space allocated to per capita within
military units. As the size of the military has decreased, units have spread out and now
consume more space then previously used.
Facility thinning is an initiative to minimize the buildings supported only to those
necessary to accomplish the mission. This effort would identify the amount of space
needed by each unit based on its mission requirements and propose a strategy to eliminate
excess capacity. This would prevent units from sprawling out into vacant spaces that
they do not really need and could result in savings by reducing the financial outlay to
maintain unnecessary buildings.
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Appendix A: Master Facilities Closure List
This is a listing of the bases recommended and approved for closure as a result of
decisions by the various Base Realignment and Closure Commissions.

Naval Station Philadelphia, PA
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA
Myrtle Beach AFB, SC
Bergstrom AFB, TX
(Active Component Only)
Carswell AFB, TX
Chase Field NAS, TX
Naval Station Puget Sound, WA

1988 Commission
16 Major Closures
George AFB, CA
Mather AFB, CA
Norton AFB, CA
Presidio of San Francisco, CA
Chanute AFB, IL
Fort Sheridan, IL
Jefferson Proving Ground, IN
Lexington Army Depot, KY
Naval Station Lake Charles, LA
Army Material Tech Lab, MA
Pease AFB, NH
Naval Station Brooklyn, NY
Philadelphia Naval Hospital, PA
Naval Station, Galveston, TX
Fort Douglas, UT
Cameron Station, VA

1993 Commission
28 Major Closures
Naval Station Mobile, AL
Mare Island Naval Shipyard, CA
MCAS El Toro, CA
Naval Airs Station Alameda, CA
Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA
Naval Hospital Oakland, CA
Naval Station Treasure Island, CA
Naval Training Center San Diego, CA
Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL
Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL
Homestead AFB, FL
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL
Naval Air Station Agana, Guam
Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI
Naval Air Station Glen view, IL
OHare IAP ARS, IL
NESEC, St. Inigoes, MD
K.I. Sawyer AFB, MI
Naval Station Staten Island, NY
Plattsburgh AFB, NY
Gentile Air Force Station, OH (DESC)
Newark AFB, OH
Defense Per. Support Center, PA
Charleston Naval Shipyard, SC
Naval Station Charleston, SC
Naval Air Station Dallas, TX
Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA
Vint Hill Farms, VA

1991 Commission
26 Major Closures
Eaker AFB, AR
Williams AFB, AZ
Castle AFB, CA
Fort Ord, CA
Hunters Point Annex, CA
Moffett NAS, CA
Naval Station Long Beach, CA
NAV ElecSysEngrCtr, San Diego, CA
Sacramento Army Depot, CA
Tustin MCAS, CA
Lowry AFB, CO
Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN
GrissomAFB,IN
England AFB, LA
Fort Devens, MA
Loring AFB, ME
Wurtsmith AFB, MI
Richards-Gebaur ARS, MO
Rickenbacker AGB, OH
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Naval Air Station, South Weymoth, MA
Fort Holabird, MD
Fort Ritchie, MD
NSWC, Dahlgren Division Detachment,
White Oak, MD
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ
Roslyn Air Guard Station, NY
Seneca Army Depot, NY
Fort Indiantown Gap, PA
NAWC, Aircraft Div., Warminster, PA
Defense Dist. Depot Memphis, TN
Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, TX
Resse AFB, TX
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, UT
Fort Pickett, VA

1995 Commission
27 Major Closures
Naval Air Facility, Adak, AK
Fort McClellan, AL
Fort Chaffee, AR
Fleet Industrial SU Center, Oakland, CA
Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, CA
McClellan AFB, CA
Oakland Army Base, CA
Ontario IAP Air Guard Station, CA
Fitzsimoms Army Medical Center, CO
Ship Repair Facility, Guam
Savanna Army Depot Activitym, IL
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft
Division, Indianapolis, IN
NAWC, Crane Division Detachment,
Louisville, KY
Source: http://www.afbca.hq.af.mil/
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Appendix B: Reclassification of Air Force Installations

The May 1988 Almanac Edition of the Air Force Magazine provides an overview
of the reclassification of Air Force installations:

During 1986, the Air Force undertook a major project to redefine and
categorize all Air Force properties and activities to reflect more accurately
actual installation posture. The new definitions reclassified all Air Force
activities into one of four categories:
major installations, minor
installations, support sites, and other activities. For an installation to be
categorized as "major," it must be operated by an active, Guard, or
Reserve unit of group size or larger and have all the organic support to
accomplish the unit's mission. Minor installations are facilities operated
by active, Guard, or Reserve unit of at least squadron size that do not
satisfy all of the criteria for a major installation. Examples of minor
installations are Guard and Reserve flying operations that are located at
civilian-owned airports. A support site is a detached piece of real property
that provides general support to the Air Force mission as opposed to
supporting a particular installation. Examples of support sites are missile
tracking sites, radar bomb-scoring sites, and radio relay sites. The fourth
classification category, other activities, includes Air Force unites that have
little or not real-property accountability over the real estate that they
occupy. Examples include units that are located on installations belonging
to other services or in leased office space that supports recruiting
detachments, Civil Air Patrol, etc. The new Air Force classification
system is designed to describe accurately the Air Force installation
posture. Previously, the Air Force reported more than 2,800 installations
worldwide. In reality, the number of independent installations totals only
262: 140 major and 122 minor [6].
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Appendix C: Regression Database

FY
1964
1968
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

MILPERS
$37,215,906,000
$39,092,780,000
$30,921,673,000
$28,755,657,000
$27,610,967,000
$26,015,162,000
$24,634,324,000
$23,043,264,000
$22,243,234,000
$22,224,196,000
$22,220,006,000
$22,453,190,000
$22,936,378,000
$23,585,890,000
$24,064,549,000
$32,578,759,000
$32,970,096,000
$33,448,954,000
$30,184,120,000
$30,143,906,000
$29,227,316,000
$29,404,567,000
$26,625,831,000
$24,933,189,000
$21,909,736,000
$23,171,517,000
$22,861,516,000
$21,766,355,000
$21,409,451,000
$20,972,712,000
$21,064,642,000

O&M
$26,647,748,000
$30,502,299,000
$27,163,356,000
$26,745,299,000
$25,962,312,000
$25,248,013,000
$24,907,580,000
$24,971,361,000
$24,397,199,000
$24,368,006,000
$26,925,996,000
$28,712,300,000
$29,150,632,000
$30,853,563,000
$31,514,048,000
$32,929,850,000
$32,578,158,000
$31,827,945,000
$33,388,346,000
$34,823,905,000
$33,410,104,000
$34,439,792,000
$26,883,728,000
$25,942,830,000
$27,484,712,000
$27,196,084,000
$25,388,936,000
$24,352,930,000
$26,198,275,000
$27,942,990,000
$26,357,344,000

Procurement
$35,886,820,000
$41,492,628,000
$23,363,788,000
$22,115,232,000
$18,637,627,000
$18,150,296,000
$20,201,298,000
$23,749,846,000
$23,840,116,000
$22,730,159,000
$24,082,380,000
$28,959,506,000
$38,539,190,000
$42,473,697,000
$52,466,041,000
$56,259,026,000
$50,197,043,000
$44,735,721,000
$35,876,788,000
$38,483,771,000
$36,444,036,000
$28,919,019,000
$26,941,851,000
$24,168,594,000
$19,396,263,000
$17,105,493,000
$17,823,062,000
$15,143,239,000
$15,930,479,000
$18,812,967,000
$18,933,160,000

RDT&E
$18,019,293,000
$14,969,920,000
$10,589,253,000
$10,707,981,000
$9,715,385,000
$9,536,990,000
$9,599,185,000
$9,661,179,000
$9,808,748,000
$9,550,275,000
$9,873,948,000
$12,707,086,000
$14,731,775,000"
$16,760,822,000
$18,642,135,000
$19,264,253,000
$18,819,378,000
$20,451,616,000
$19,973,883,000
$18,462,452,000"
$16,701,653,000"
$14,102,189,000"
$15,047,677,000"
$14,448,136,000"
$13,497,356,000
$12,626,141,000
$13,365,262,000
$14,765,572,000
$14,942,030,000
$14,179,402,000
$14,567,219,000

Notes:
(1) Shaded cell indicates mathematical interpolation was used to estimate the values.
(2) Dollars in constant FY2001
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FY
1964
1968

MILCON
$2,610,949,000
$2,179,450,000

Farn. Housing
$232,613,000
$239,052,000

Total
$120,613,329,000
$128,476,129,000

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

$1,082,510,000
$1,072,636,000
$1,076,230,000
$1,260,468,000
$1,637,654,000
$1,976,327,000
$1,240,043,000
$1,036,763,000
$1,121,568,000
$1,760,855,000
$2,640,790,000
$2,428,104,000
$2,392,758,000
$2,450,324,000
$2,307,375,000
$1,921,362,000
$1,922,176,000
$1,771,608,000
$1,561,604,000
$1,326,286,000
$1,390,732,000
$1,159,157,000
$1,441,759,000
$889,208,000
$821,654,000
$1,054,673,000
$961,763,000
$1,441,145,000
$1,583,921,000

$318,279,000
$317,769,000
$327,608,000
$308,772,000
$355,962,000
$376,271,000
$431,718,000
$518,784,000
$507,733,000
$702,317,000
$893,810,000
$1,345,201,000
$1,199,180,000
$1,234,204,000
$1,029,150,000
$1,107,451,000
$1,175,980,000
$1,203,594,000
$1,069,297,000
$1,132,151,000
$1,244,600,000
$1,328,795,000
$1,099,995,000
$1,228,563,000
$1,213,935,000
$1,187,609,000
$1,158,383,000
$1,121,585,000
$1,183,191,000

$93,438,859,000
$89,714,574,000
$83,330,129,000
$80,519,701,000
$81,351,003,000
$83,837,048,000
$81,995,658,000
$80,454,983,000
$84,731,631,000
$95,323,554,000
$108,971,375,000
$117,608,877,000
$131,567,436,000
$145,265,009,000
$138,296,721,000
$133,633,029,000
$122,747,300,000
$125,076,136,000
$118,525,110,000
$110,268,904,000
$113,720,918,000
$93,290,579,000
$101,606,758,000
$96,580,285,000
$95,904,943,000
$92,181,565,000
$100,805,618,000
$104,039,573,000
$103,333,525,000
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FY

Major

ADAF

# Aircraft

Flying Hours

1964
1968
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

216

855,802
904,759
725,635
690,999
643,795
612,551
585,207
570,479
569,491
559,450
557,969
570,302
582,845
592,044
597,125
601,515
608,199
607,035
576,446
570,880
535,233
510,432
470,315
444,351
426,327
400,409
389,001
377,385
367,470
360,590
357,777

15,380
15,327
13,498
12,910
12,132
11,196
9,287
9,256
9,138
9,037
9,069
9,180
9,213
9,355
9,401
9,443
9,591
9,447
9,416
9,279
9,032
8,510
7,640
7,182
6,815
6,633
6,294
6,330
6,228
6,203
6,178

6,662
7,697
5,102
4,454
3,805
3,477
3,149
3,167
3,103
3,208
3,125
3,201
3,341
3,389
3,422
3,477
3,555
3,463
3,340
3,412
3,366
3,166
2,790
2,584
2,317
2,253
2,181
2,205
2,154
2,132
2,110

198
161

167
154
148

140
134
134
134
134
134
134
135
136
137
139
138
140
141
139
139
124
121
102
94
90
88
87
87
87

Notes:
(1) Shaded cell indicates mathematical interpolation was used to estimate the values.
(2) Dollars in constant FY2001
(3) "Major" is the number of major Air Force installations
(4) "ADAF" is the number of active duty Air Force members
(5) "# Aircraft" is the number of Air Force aircraft
(6) "Flying Hours" is the number of flying hours flown each fiscal year
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Appendix D; Operations & Maintenance Regression Data

Regression Statistics
0.7346586
0.5397233
0.5068463
2.312E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
Major

df
2
28
30

ANOVA
MS
SS
1.75E+20 8.77E+19
1.5E+20 5.34E+18
3.25E+20

F
16.41648

Significance F
1.92E-05

Standard Error
1.97E+11
97470776
31326628

Coefficients
-1.05E+12
533906490
176971606

P-value
1.07E-05
7.53E-06
4.72E-06

$40,000,000,000 -,
$35,000,000,000
$30,000,000,000
<fr $25,000,000,000
© $20,000,000,000
U_ $15,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$5,000,000,000
$0

Tt(N^fCD00O<M'"tCD00OCM'*CDC0O
coh-h-h-h-cococococoOTOCBCDcno
O>0>0>05050>0>050)0>05050)0>0)0
T-T-T-T-1-T-T-1-T-T-T-1-T-T-T-CN

Fiscal Year
•Actual
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FY-MAJ

Regression Statistics
0.7978287
0.6365306
0.6105685
2.054E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Sqiaare
Standard Error
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
ADAF

df
2
28
30

ANOVA
MS
SS
1.03E+20
2.07E+20
1.18E+20 4.22E+18
3.25E+20

F
24.51769

Standard Error
1.95E+11
96607532
7080.094

Coefficients
-1.3E+12
653766989
48986.641

Significance F
7.02E-07

P-value
3.36E-07
2.38E-07
1.61E-07

$40,000,000,000 -i
$30,000,000,000 ▼

—»■?",■

O

$20,000,000,000 $10,000,000,000 $0Tt(N^tCDCOOCM^t<DOOOCM^|-CDCOO
CDh*h-I^-r^COCOCOOOOOO>0)a)050>0
o>a)0)0)0)CDO>a>o>o>o>a)0)0>CT>o

Fiscal Year
-•-Actual

FY-ADAF-«-FY-MAJ
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1964
1968
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

$26,647,748,000
$30,502,299,000
$27,163,356,000
$26,745,299,000
$25,962,312,000
$25,248,013,000
$24,907,580,000
$24,971,361,000
$24,397,199,000
$24,368,006,000
$26,925,996,000
$28,712,300,000
$29,150,632,000
$30,853,563,000
$31,514,048,000
$32,929,850,000
$32,578,158,000
$31,827,945,000
$33,388,346,000
$34,823,905,000
$33,410,104,000
$34,439,792,000
$26,883,728,000
$25,942,830,000
$27,484,712,000
$27,196,084,000
$25,388,936,000
$24,352,930,000
$26,198,275,000
$27,942,990,000
$26,357,344,000

$29,531,194,990
$34,544,501,931
$28,384,886,793
$27,341,952,481
$25,683,354,066
$24,806,582,441
$24,120,858,716
$24,053,150,456
$24,658,518,643
$24,820,410,769
$25,401,628,542
$26,659,547,774
$27,927,754,202
$29,032,149,301
$29,934,817,413
$30,803,635,756
$31,784,829,454
$32,381,575,992
$31,536,890,617
$31,917,997,962
$30,825,538,157
$30,264,387,460
$28,952,957,370
$28,334,835,210
$28,105,666,980
$27,489,798,206
$27,584,725,593
$27,669,463,759
$27,837,528,202
$28,154,267,100
$28,670,234,667

$32,056,203,398
$31,006,340,443
$26,594,016,964
$28,189,753,094
$26,423,028,700
$25,895,105,551
$25,013,239,190
$24,485,316,041
$25,019,222,532
$25,553,129,022
$26,087,035,512
$26,620,942,003
$27,154,848,493
$27,865,726,590
$28,576,604,687
$29,287,482,783
$30,175,332,487
$30,532,267,371
$31,420,117,074
$32,130,995,171
$32,310,958,448
$32,844,864,939
$30,724,197,332
$30,727,189,003
$27,898,634,970
$27,016,768,608
$26,842,788,673
$27,022,751,950
$27,379,686,834
$27,913,593,324
$28,447,499,815

Notes:
(1) "FY-ADAF" is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and active duty Air
Force members.
(2) "FY-MAJ" " is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and major
installations.
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Appendix E: Military Construction Regression Data

Regression Statistics
0.500899
0.2509
0.197393
4.95E+08
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Erroi
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
Major

df
2
28
30

SS
2.3E+18
6.87E+18
9.18E+18

Coefficients
-5.7E+10
28177578
16384385

ANOVA
MS
1.15E+18
2.45E+17

F
4.689097

Significance F
0.017521

Standard Error
4.23E+10
20889770
6713869

P-value
0.191972
0.188188
0.021256

$3,000,000,000
$2,500,000,000
iA.

$2,000,000,000

O $1,500,000,000
"" $1,000,000,000
$500,000,000

*^>f^&-

$0
■«frCNTrCDCOOCM^COCOOCJTl-CDCOO

coh*h-r^h-cococococoo)a>a>0)o>o
o>a>o>a>a>C)a>a>o>a>a>oa>o>a>o
T-!-T--*--»-l-f-T-T-T-T-!--I-T-T-C\J

Fiscal Year
■Actual

FY-MAJ

Note: As indicated by the p-values for the intercept and fiscal year, this regression model
is significantly insignificant; however, it is presented to compare with the results of the
model using the surrogate measure.
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Regression Statistics
0.607323
0.368841
0.323758
4.55E+08
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
ADAF

df
2
28
30

SS
3.38E+18
5.79E+18
9.18E+18

ANOVA
MS
1.69E+18
2.07E+17

Coefficients
-1E+11
51286519
5497.11

F
8.181402

Standard Error
4.32E+10
21386785
1567.377

Significance F
0.001592

P-value
0.023957
0.023392
0.001547

$3,000,000,000
$2,500,000,000

</* $2,000,000,000
O $1,500,000,000 ff
"" $1,000,000,000
$500,000,000
$0
^fCMTtCOCOOCM^CDCOOCOTfCDCOO

cor^-t^r^-h-cococococoo^ooocBo

0>0>0)0050>0>050)0>05OT050>C)0
T-T-l-l-l-l-T-f-T-T-l-f-l-l-f-CM

Fiscal Year
■Actual

FY-ADAF
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FY-MAJ

FY
1964
1968
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Actual
$2,610,949,000
$2,179,450,000
$1,082,510,000
$1,072,636,000
$1,076,230,000
$1,260,468,000
$1,637,654,000
$1,976,327,000
$1,240,043,000
$1,036,763,000
$1,121,568,000
$1,760,855,000
$2,640,790,000
$2,428,104,000
$2,392,758,000
$2,450,324,000
$2,307,375,000
$1,921,362,000
$1,922,176,000
$1,771,608,000
$1,561,604,000
$1,326,286,000
$1,390,732,000
$1,159,157,000
$1,441,759,000
$889,208,000
$821,654,000
$1,054,673,000
$961,763,000
$1,441,145,000
$1,583,921,000

FY-ADAF
$2,185,911,397
$2,660,179,510
$1,880,661,165
$1,741,549,765
$1,533,350,680
$1,412,885,479
$1,313,859,008
$1,284,184,084
$1,330,039,457
$1,326,129,489
$1,369,274,788
$1,488,357,170
$1,608,593,946
$1,710,448,384
$1,789,665,721
$1,865,084,555
$1,953,113,760
$1,998,001,642
$1,881,137,048
$1,901,826,650
$1,757,157,671
$1,672,110,352
$1,502,869,289
$1,411,428,831
$1,363,635,430
$1,272,447,839
$1,261,023,322
$1,248,455,405
$1,245,238,073
$1,258,704,472
$1,294,527,619

FY-MAJ
$2,379,648,343
$2,197,439,719
$1,703,927,775
$1,830,411,665
$1,645,592,234
$1,575,463,500
$1,472,565,996
$1,402,437,262
$1,430,614,839
$1,458,792,417
$1,486,969,995
$1,515,147,573
$1,543,325,150
$1,587,887,113
$1,632,449,076
$1,677,011,039
$1,737,957,387
$1,749,750,580
$1,810,696,928
$1,855,258,891
$1,850,667,698
$1,878,845,276
$1,661,257,074
$1,640,281,496
$1,357,155,754
$1,254,258,250
$1,216,898,286
$1,212,307,094
$1,224,100,286
$1,252,277,864
$1,280,455,441

Notes:
(1) "FY-ADAF" is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and active duty Air
Force members.
(2) "FY-MAJ" " is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and major
installations.
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Appendix F: Military Personnel Regression Data
Regression Statistics
0.8929674
0.7973907
0.7829186
2.313E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Sq uare
Standard Error
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
Major

o
>-

SS
df
2 5.89E+20
28 1.5E+20
30 7.39E+20

Coefficients
-1.02E+12
509592314
274512024

ANOVA
MS
2.95E+20
5.35E+18

F
55.09851

Significance F
1.96E-10

Standard Error
1.97E+11
97507316
31338371

P-value
1.7E-05
1.49E-05
1.64E-09

$45,000, 000,000
$40,000, 000,000
$35,000, 000,000
$30,000, 000,000
$25,000, 000,000
$20,000, 000,000
$15,000, 000,000
$10,000, 000,000
$5,000, 000,000
$0
^•CM^tDOOOCM^-CDOOOCM^COCOO

cor^-h-h-h-cococooocooc^oooo

O>05050>050>0)05050>0>0>0>0)050
1—
T—
f—
1—
T-1—
1—
T—
T-f-T-f—
T-T-f—
C\J

Fiscal Year
■Actual
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FY-MAJ

Regression Statistics
0.9188878
0.8443548
0.8332373
2.027E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Erroi
Observations

k

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
ADAF

SS
df
2 6.24E+20
28 1.15E+20
30 7.39E+20

ANOVA
MS
3.12E+20
4.11E+18

Coefficients
-1.31E+12
654598674
72710.012

$45,000,000,000
$40,000,000,000
$35,000,000,000
i/J. $30,000,000,000
g $25,000,000,000
>- $20,000,000,000
U- $15,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$5,000,000,000

W,

—

P-value
2.12E-07
1.84E-07
3.95E-11

Standard Error
1.93E+11
95320772
6985.791

-i
-L_
^ "
♦*A
^"»■■■■ifi?
- |1II1M^^
• SS^M»Q3iSt^^lSi^»
-

Significance F
4.9E-12

F
75.94818

—_

..JA»"***-

—

^kftA.,
■ ■■■*'«

'':il^b;1MMilltell|

—

■—

~

~|

W f—i—i—i—i—r~T i i i""
i i i i
Ttc\l'*t<OOOOC\J'<t<OCOOC\J*t<OCOO
CQr^-l^t^h-COCOCOCOCOOO^OCDO^O
050)00>cnro05CBO)050>050>cno>o

Fiscal Year
PV A RAP —■--r
■ PV
MA 1
ri-AUAr
Y-IVIMJ

Ai-tn-il
* Actual

— A—
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FY
1964
1968
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Actual
$37,215,906,000
$39,092,780,000
$30,921,673,000
$28,755,657,000
$27,610,967,000
$26,015,162,000
$24,634,324,000
$23,043,264,000
$22,243,234,000
$22,224,196,000
$22,220,006,000
$22,453,190,000
$22,936,378,000
$23,585,890,000
$24,064,549,000
$32,578,759,000
$32,970,096,000
$33,448,954,000
$30,184,120,000
$30,143,906,000
$29,227,316,000
$29,404,567,000
$26,625,831,000
$24,933,189,000
$21,909,736,000
$23,171,517,000
$22,861,516,000
$21,766,355,000
$21,409,451,000
$20,972,712,000
$21,064,642,000

FY-ADAF
$34,716,951,076
$40,895,009,823
$30,489,296,362
$28,625,511,067
$25,847,906,343
$24,230,753,408
$22,897,169,519
$22,480,895,139
$23,063,656,322
$22,988,173,767
$23,535,088,914
$25,086,420,164
$26,653,020,517
$27,976,478,590
$29,000,516,835
$29,974,312,461
$31,114,904,854
$31,684,869,075
$30,115,341,198
$30,365,235,946
$28,427,940,829
$27,279,258,500
$25,016,949,630
$23,783,705,557
$23,127,778,979
$21,897,879,567
$21,723,002,426
$21,533,001,603
$21,466,680,510
$21,621,034,303
$22,071,099,714

FY-MAJ
$38,770,020,899
$35,867,173,720
$27,748,598,083
$29,905,262,541
$26,846,198,542
$25,708,718,711
$24,022,214,832
$22,884,735,001
$23,394,327,315
$23,903,919,629
$24,413,511,942
$24,923,104,256
$25,432,696,570
$26,216,800,907
$27,000,905,245
$27,785,009,583
$28,843,625,945
$29,078,706,235
$30,137,322,597
$30,921,426,934
$30,881,995,200
$31,391,587,514
$27,783,499,466
$27,469,555,707
$22,763,419,563
$21,076,915,684
$20,488,459,901
$20,449,028,167
$20,684,108,457
$21,193,700,770
$21,703,293,084

Notes:
(1) "FY-ADAF" is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and active duty Air
Force members.
(2) "FY-MAJ" " is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and major
installations.
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Appendix G: Military Family Housing Regression Data

Regression Statistics
0.909255
0.826744
0.814369
1.73E+08
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Sq uare
Standard Error
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
Major

df
2
28
30

ANOVA
MS
SS
4.02E+18 2.01E+18
8.43E+17 3.01E+16
4.86E+18

Coefficients
-1.2E+11
58270119
7885578

F
66.8053

Significance F
2.2E-11

Standard Error
1.48E+10
7313738
2350599

P-value
1.58E-08
1.12E-08
0.002295

$1,600,000,000
$1,400,000,000
$1,200,000,000
«9- $1,000,000,000
O
U.

$800,000,000
$600,000,000
$400,000,000 H
$200,000,000

$0
■^tCM-'tCOCOOOJ^tCOCOOCVJ'^COCpO
CDK.r^h-h-COGOCOCOCOO>050505050
O>0)0}0>00)050}00>0>0)00)0)0

Fiscal Year
■Actual
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FY-MAJ

Regression Statistics
0.9186667
0.8439486
0.8328021
164631342
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Erroi
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
ADAF

SS
df
2 4.1E+18
28 7.59E+17
30 4.86E+18

ANOVA
MS
2.05E+18
2.71E+16

Coefficients
-1.28E+11
64321178
2239.6404

F
75.71403

Standard Error
1.57E+10
7741788
567.3739

Significance F
5.08E-12

P-value
6.65E-09
4.86E-09
0.000484

$1,600,000,000
$1,400,000,000
$1,200,000,000«a- $1,000,000,000
O

$800,000,000

U_

$600,000,000
$400,000,000
$200,000,000
$0
TtCMTfCDCOOCM^tCDOOOCVJ^CDOOO

cDr^-S-h-h-cococooocoooosooo

0)0>050)0>05050>05050>a>05050>0

^-T-i-f-T-^-i--*-^-^--*-T-'-'-T-CM

Fiscal Year
FY-ADAF

•Actual
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FY-MAJ

FY

Actual

FY-ADAF

FY-MAJ

1964
1968
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

$232,613,000
$239,052,000
$318,279,000
$317,769,000
$327,608,000
$308,772,000
$355,962,000
$376,271,000
$431,718,000
$518,784,000
$507,733,000
$702,317,000
$893,810,000
$1,345,201,000
$1,199,180,000
$1,234,204,000
$1,029,150,000
$1,107,451,000
$1,175,980,000
$1,203,594,000
$1,069,297,000
$1,132,151,000
$1,244,600,000
$1,328,795,000
$1,099,995,000
$1,228,563,000
$1,213,935,000
$1,187,609,000
$1,158,383,000
$1,121,585,000
$1,183,191,000

$204,710,539
$571,641,326
$427,752,696
$414,501,690
$373,102,884
$367,448,738
$370,529,190
$401,864,945
$463,973,359
$505,806,308
$566,810,579
$658,753,242
$751,166,230
$836,089,860
$911,790,651
$985,943,851
$1,065,234,785
$1,126,949,022
$1,122,761,841
$1,174,617,181
$1,159,101,899
$1,167,877,756
$1,142,351,281
$1,148,522,437
$1,172,476,337
$1,178,750,516
$1,217,521,877
$1,255,827,393
$1,297,942,537
$1,346,854,989
$1,404,876,059

$314,853,808
$405,993,888
$347,307,994
$452,891,578
$408,649,189
$419,605,842
$414,791,341
$425,747,994
$484,018,113
$542,288,232
$600,558,351
$658,828,470
$717,098,589
$783,254,286
$849,409,982
$915,565,679
$989,606,953
$1,039,991,494
$1,114,032,769
$1,180,188,465
$1,222,687,429
$1,280,957,548
$1,220,944,003
$1,255,557,390
$1,164,001,535
$1,159,187,033
$1,185,914,842
$1,228,413,806
$1,278,798,347
$1,337,068,466
$1,395,338,585

Notes:
(1) "FY-ADAF" is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and active duty Air
Force members.
(2) "FY-MAJ" " is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and major
installations.
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Appendix H: Research & Development Regression Data

Regression Statistics
0.776318
0.60267
0.57429
2.27E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
Major

SS
df
2 2.18E+20
28 1.44E+20
30 3.62E+20

ANOVA
MS
1.09E+20
5.13E+18

Coefficients
-1.2E+12
6.21E+08
1.84E+08

21.23522

Significance F
2.44E-06

P-value
5.73E-07
4.77E-07
1.86E-06

Standard Error
1.93E+11
95525092
30701294

$25,000,000,000
$20,000,000,000

o
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$15,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
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Fiscal Year
•Actual
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FY-MAJ

T-f—

OJ

Regression Statistics
0.865066
0.748339
0.730364
1.8E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Erroi
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
ADAF

df
2
28
30

SS
2.71E+20
9.1E+19
3.62E+20

ANOVA
MS
1.35E+20
3.25E+18

Coefficients
-1.5E+12
7.73E+08
53067.07

F
41.63047

Significance F
4.09E-09

P-value
8.66E-10
7.21E-10
2.78E-09

Standard Error
1.71E+11
84793339
6214.265

$25,000,000,000
$20,000,000,000

V3

^ $15,000,000,000

o
j£ $10,000,000,000
$5,000,000,000
$0

TtCVJ^CDOOOCNTl-CDCOOCM^CDCOO

cor^i^r^h-cococooocoooocnroo

0)C3)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)a)0)£3)0)0
1_T_^1-T-T-1-1-T--^-I-T-T-T-T-CM

Fiscal Year
■Actual

FY-ADAF
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FY-MAJ

FY
1964
1968
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

Actual
$18,019,293,000
$14,969,920,000
$10,589,253,000
$10,707,981,000
$9,715,385,000
$9,536,990,000
$9,599,185,000
$9,661,179,000
$9,808,748,000
$9,550,275,000
$9,873,948,000
$12,707,086,000

FY-ADAF
$14,130,685,015
$19,818,955,133
$13,403,634,284
$12,338,169,522
$10,605,757,793
$9,720,296,541
$9,041,796,872
$9,032,791,390
$9,752,927,485
$9,992,647,372
$10,686,621,400
$12,113,663,967

FY-MAJ
$16,667,404,218
$15,840,458,546
$11,517,298,361
$13,242,680,490
$11,471,848,106
$10,989,094,753
$10,138,318,819
$9,655,565,466
$10,276,879,854
$10,898,194,242
$11,519,508,630
$12,140,823,018

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

$14,731,775,000
$16,760,822,000
$18,642,135,000
$19,264,253,000
$18,819,378,000
$20,451,616,000
$19,973,883,000
$18,462,452,000
$16,701,653,000
$14,102,189,000
$15,047,677,000
$14,448,136,000
$13,497,356,000
$12,626,141,000
$13,365,262,000
$14,765,572,000
$14,942,030,000
$14,179,402,000
$14,567,219,000

$13,551,850,620
$14,812,580,982
$15,854,781,140
$16,860,311,950
$17,987,578,625
$18,698,374,915
$17,847,672,596
$18,324,867,632
$17,205,752,060
$16,662,201,957
$15,305,876,571
$14,700,609,462
$14,516,694,909
$13,913,868,886
$14,081,046,084
$14,237,185,332
$14,483,591,670
$14,891,056,573
$15,514,345,261

$12,762,137,406
$13,567,463,084
$14,372,788,763
$15,178,114,441
$16,167,451,409
$16,604,754,507
$17,594,091,476
$18,399,417,154
$18,652,708,962
$19,274,023,350
$17,135,168,385
$17,204,448,902
$14,329,548,776
$13,478,772,843
$13,364,042,070
$13,617,333,878
$14,054,636,976
$14,675,951,364
$15,297,265,752

Notes:
(1) "FY-ADAF" is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and active duty Air
Force members.
(2) "FY-MAJ" " is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and major
installations.
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Appendix I: Procurement Regression Data
Regression Statistics
0.5964457
0.3557474
0.3097294
9.728E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
Major

SS
df
2 1.46E+21
28 2.65E+21
30 4.11E+21

Coefficients
-2.22E+12
1.1E+09
486120971

ANOVA
MS
7.32E+20
9.46E+19

F
7.730608

Significance F
0.002122

Standard Error
8.3E+11
4.1E+08
1.32E+08

P-value
0.012372
0.012141
0.000964

$60,000,000,000
$50,000,000,000
w.

$40,000,000,000

O

$30,000,000,000

U-

$20,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$0
'>*C\1'*CDOOOC\I'*COCOOCM'*CDCOO
co^-r^h-r^cocooococoOTo^ooOTo
o>o>o>o>05cncno>cno30>05cna50>o
T-T-f-f-l-T-T-T-f-l-f-T-l-l-T-CJ

Fiscal Year
■Actual -»-FY-MAJ
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Regression Statistics
0.75049717
0.56324601
0.53204929
8009329955
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
ADAF

SS
df
2 2.32E+21
28 1.8E+21
30 4.11E+21

ANOVA
MS
1.16E+21
6.41E+19

Coefficients
-3.513E+12
1739855078

159440.649

18.05466

Standard Error
7.62E+11
3.77E+08
27602.79

Significance F
9.19E-06

P-value
8E-05
7.85E-05
3.35E-06

$60,000,000,000
$50,000,000,000
i& $40,000,000,000
©

$30,000,000,000

U-

$20,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$0
'*Ca'*CDCOOPJ'<t<DOOO<M^tCDOOO

coh-h-h-h-cococococoa^ooosojo
.r-,-T-T-T-f-T-i-T-T-'*--*--'-'»-T-CM

Fiscal Year
■Actual

FY-ADAF
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FY-MAJ

FY
1964
1968
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

Actual
$35,886,820,000
$41,492,628,000
$23,363,788,000
$22,115,232,000
$18,637,627,000
$18,150,296,000
$20,201,298,000
$23,749,846,000

FY-ADAF
$40,933,959,689
$55,699,115,845
$34,098,889,380
$30,316,358,146
$24,529,976,838
$21,288,268,284
$18,668,378,261
$18,059,991,464

FY-MAJ
$46,834,317,964
$42,483,715,989
$28,896,815,570
$32,913,435,269
$27,693,756,524
$25,876,924,574
$23,087,850,683
$21,271,018,733

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

$23,840,116,000
$22,730,159,000
$24,082,380,000
$28,959,506,000
$38,539,190,000
$42,473,697,000
$52,466,041,000
$56,259,026,000
$50,197,043,000
$44,735,721,000
$35,876,788,000
$38,483,771,000
$36,444,036,000
$28,919,019,000
$26,941,851,000
$24,168,594,000
$19,396,263,000
$17,105,493,000
$17,823,062,000
$15,143,239,000
$15,930,479,000
$18,812,967,000
$18,933,160,000

$19,642,319,181
$19,781,230,704
$21,284,954,182
$24,991,190,782
$28,730,909,918
$31,937,459,524
$34,487,432,539
$36,927,232,066
$39,732,788,440
$41,287,054,603
$38,149,779,675
$39,002,188,102
$35,058,462,372
$32,844,029,919
$28,187,604,489
$25,787,742,561
$24,653,839,385
$22,261,311,727
$22,182,267,884
$22,070,060,385
$22,229,061,431
$22,871,964,845
$24,163,313,378

$22,370,912,608
$23,470,806,483
$24,570,700,357
$25,670,594,232
$26,770,488,106
$28,356,502,952
$29,942,517,797
$31,528,532,643
$33,600,668,459
$34,214,441,363
$36,286,577,179
$37,872,592,024
$38,000,243,957
$39,100,137,832
$32,908,217,145
$32,549,748,108
$24,413,343,538
$21,624,269,647
$20,779,679,639
$20,907,331,572
$21,521,104,476
$22,620,998,350
$23,720,892,225

Notes:
(1) "FY-ADAF" is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and active duty Air
Force members.
(2) "FY-MAJ" " is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and major
installations.
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Appendix .T: Total Air Force Regression Data

Regression Statistics
0.739483
0.546835
0.514466
1.32E+10
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
Major

df
SS
2
5.9E+21
28 4.89E+21
30 1.08E+22

Coefficients
-6.2E+12
3.1E+09
1.03E+09

ANOVA
MS
2.95E+21
1.75E+20

F
16.89384

Significance F
1.54E-05

Standard Error
1.13E+12
5.57E+08
1.79E+08

P-value
7.43E-06
6.02E-06
3.81E-06

$160,000,000,000
$140,000,000,000
$120,000,000,000

<& $100,000,000,000
O

$80,000,000,000

U.

$60,000,000,000

^^^-

$40,000,000,000
$20,000,000,000

$0

■<*CMT|-COOOOCVJ*<tCOCOOCM'<frCOCOO
C0h-h-r^r^00C0C000C0a)0)0)0)0)O
0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0
T-T-T-T-f-!-T--r-t-1--|-T-1-f-l-C\l

Fiscal Year
■Actual
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FY-MAJ

Regression Statistics
0.898113
0.806607
0.792793
8.64E+09
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Sq uare
Standard Error
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
FY
ADAF

df
2
28
30

SS
8.71E+21
2.09E+21
1.08E+22

ANOVA
MS
4.35E+21
7.46E+19

F
58.39137

Standard Error
8.21E+11
4.06E+08
29761.37

Coefficients
-8.5E+12
4.22E+09
318481

Significance F
1.02E-10

P-value
5.03E-11
4.01E-11
2.11E-11

$160,000,000,000
$140,000,000,000
$120,000,000,000

p*"*""*^1^^

V> $100,000,000,000
O

$80,000,000,000

U.

$60,000,000,000
$40,000,000,000
$20,000,000,000
$0
Tj-CM^COOOOCM-^COCOOOJ^frCOCgO
cDr^r^.|^i^.cooooooooo(ji050>a)0>o
T-!-T-T-1-T-!-1-T-!-1--T-T-T-'»-C\l

Fiscal Year
■Actual
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FY-ADAF

FY-MAJ

FY
1964
1968
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Actual
$120,613,329,000
$128,476,129,000
$93,438,859,000
$89,714,574,000
$83,330,129,000
$80,519,701,000
$81,351,003,000
$83,837,048,000
$81,995,658,000
$80,454,983,000
$84,731,631,000
$95,323,554,000
$108,971,375,000
$117,608,877,000
$131,567,436,000
$145,265,009,000
$138,296,721,000
$133,633,029,000
$122,747,300,000
$125,076,136,000
$118,525,110,000
$110,268,904,000
$113,720,918,000
$93,290,579,000
$101,606,758,000
$96,580,285,000
$95,904,943,000
$92,181,565,000
$100,805,618,000
$104,039,573,000
$103,333,525,000

FY-ADAF
$113,224,791,114
$145,711,848,637
$105,559,441,080
$98,752,328,941
$87,942,547,588
$82,215,723,003
$77,730,974,319
$77,264,181,939
$81,173,318,506
$82,199,246,575
$85,951,372,008
$94,102,993,983
$102,321,496,967
$109,474,999,486
$115,316,997,245
$120,938,924,632
$127,291,447,435
$131,144,531,346
$125,626,311,816
$128,077,442,362
$120,948,345,932
$117,273,494,433
$108,720,787,930
$104,675,543,028
$103,159,037,270
$99,128,442,493
$99,719,007,034
$100,243,327,528
$101,309,384,203
$103,342,030,714
$106,669,939,455

FY-MAJ
$126,433,403,483
$120,357,311,492
$94,783,636,557
$104,039,593,607
$93,797,967,713
$90,739,661,851
$85,628,978,837
$82,570,672,976
$85,669,498,570
$88,768,324,163
$91,867,149,757
$94,965,975,351
$98,064,800,945
$102,189,815,115
$106,314,829,285
$110,439,843,455
$115,591,046,201
$117,663,683,219
$122,814,885,964
$126,939,900,134
$127,986,348,576
$131,085,174,170
$118,791,171,125
$118,811,430,991
$102,412,673,642
$97,301,990,628
$96,296,061,918
$97,342,510,360
$99,415,147,378
$102,513,972,972
$105,612,798,566

Notes:
(1) "FY-ADAF" is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and active duty Air
Force members.
(2) "FY-MAJ" " is the result of regressing the budget by fiscal year and major
installations.
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Appendix K: Active Dutv Personnel versus Major Installations Data

Regression Statistics
0.968159
0.937333
0.903999
7.506573
31

Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Sq uare
Standard Erroi
Observations

Regression
Residual
Total

ANOVA
MS
25284.64
56.34864

SS
df
1 25284.64
30 1690.459
31 26975.1

Significance F
3.44E-19

Standard Error
t Stat
P-value
#N/A
#N/A
#N/A
2.36E-06 100.64
1.64E-39

Coefficients
0
0.000238

Intercept
ADAF

F
448.7178

Note: When you exclude the intercept (which forces it to zero), there are no significance
statistics, therefore, Excel prints N/A for "not applicable".
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Fiscal Year
■Actual
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Predicted

FY

Actual

Predicted

1964
1968
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

216
198
161
167
154
148
140
134
134
134
134
134
134
135
136
137
139
138
140
141
139
139
124
121
102
94
90
88
87
87
87

204
215
173
164
153
146
139
136
135
133
133
136
139
141
142
143
145
144
137
136
127
121
112
106
101
95
93
90
87
86
85

85
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